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Using a new firm-level database, we address micro determinants and employment consequences 
of international production outsourcing (INPOU). 
Regarding the former, we confirm that INPOU in Italy mostly counters emerging economies’ 
threats to traditional manufactured goods: INPOU disproportionately targets developing 
countries and intensifies in sectors with stiffest Chinese competition. 
Concerning employment consequences, we concur with previous literature that INPOU firms’ 
domestic employment performances are no worse than at matching no-INPOU firms. However, 
given Italy’s industrial structure (small-sized networked enterprises), INPOU might negatively 
affect subcontracting firms. Our evidence that employment performances worsen in the 
productive segments with strongest INPOU supports our conjecture. 
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Though lagging with respect to other countries, Italian companies have recently 
accelerated their International outsourcing of production (INPOU) – sometimes 
denominated international production fragmentation. It is generally believed that Italian 
firms’ INPOU is mostly aimed to respond against the increasing competition by 
emerging economies’ manufacturing in the traditional goods segments typical of the 
made in Italy (e.g., textiles & clothing, leather & shoes, furnishing, etc.). Through this, 
unskilled labor intensive phases of production are outsourced to cheap labor countries 
(De Arcangelis et al., 2002; Ferragina and Quintieri, 2002). Only in a limited number of 
cases, Italian firms’ INPOU focuses on developed markets. 
This paper tries to address two research questions employing a new firm-level 
database compiled at ISAE on the basis of two ad-hoc surveys run in May 2003 and 
April 2005. First, we study the micro determinants of INPOU. Next, we investigate the 
employment consequences of INPOU. 
Studying the micro determinants of INPOU pertains to the domain of industrial 
economics. It is certainly not a novel question to ask which are the most important 
factors to induce companies to venture into this challenging action. Nevertheless, our 
contribution in this respect is twofold. On one hand, thanks to the flexibility of the ISAE 
surveys, we have access to fresher data than most other studies (e.g., Capitalia released 
its 2003 data just a few months ago). On the other hand, owing to the fact that the ISAE 
sample is highly representative, we can observe INPOU in a more comprehensive 
manner (e.g. even at small firms, often not covered by other FDI databases, such as that 
employed by Cominotti, et al.). 
Also investigating the occupational consequences in Italy when companies venture 
into INPOU is not innovative (see, e.g., Barba Navaretti and Castellani, 2005). Yet, 
even in this case, we make two contributions. Firstly, for the reasons already sketched 
above, our results may be more general, thanks to the highly representative ISAE 
sample. Secondly, and most importantly, we make a contribution by addressing 
INPOU’s overall employment effects, something which, to our knowledge has been 
neglected thus far. Specifically, we posit that the singularity of Italy’s industrial 
structure requires particular care. Since Italy’s productive sector consists primarily of a 
myriad of networked small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), considering only the 
employment performance at INPOU firms per se appears incomplete, if not potentially 
misleading. In other words, while for the large companies, typical of other developed 
countries, the occupational impact of INPOU may be generally limited within the 
individual company – possibly inducing labor mobility across different mother 
company’s departments and/or group affiliates – this is unlikely the end of the story in 
Italy, where most of the brunt may fall on subcontracting firms. Indeed, in Italy, the 
bulk of unskilled labor intensive phases of production are already outsourced to 
subcontracting firms, which may be the heaviest bitten by INPOU (e.g., in the 
experience of Natuzzi’s INPOU, not so many jobs were lost at Natuzzi itself, as much 
as at subcontracting firms in the area). For this reason, our analysis tries to uncover also 
the occupational consequences of INPOU for entire productive segments, where 




we will see, results differ substantially whether we limit INPOU’s employment effect 
only to those experienced by the firms undertaking this reorganization or, instead, 
consider INPOU’s more general employment impact. 
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 sketches a brief survey of the relevant literature. 
Section 3 is devoted to illustrate our database, display some descriptive evidence, 
perform our econometric analyses and present the related results. Section 4 draws to a 
close by discussing policy implications and research avenues for the future. 
 
 
2. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
In the last decade, a boom in theoretical and empirical literature on the domestic 
effects of international outsourcing of production (INPOU) followed the political and 
social concerns that relocating (part of) business abroad depletes employment and 
worsen performance at home. 
In this respect, theoretical works have detected the features, rationale and likely 
effects of INPOU, but the arguments are not conclusive. A very general (and popular) 
view states that whether firms opt for vertical or horizontal investment abroad, activities 
at home can be affected positively or negatively, depending on: a)  the intensity of 
technological integration between the activities at home and those moved abroad (in 
case of vertical investments), and b) whether the foreign and domestic productions are 
complements or substitutes (in case of horizontal investments). Barba Navaretti and 
Venables (2004) provide a comprehensive discussion on this subject. Not surprisingly, 
then, economic debates are mostly on the empirical ground. 
The effects of INPOU on the domestic activities and performance of the firm that 
invest abroad is one of the most addressed issues. In this respect, some works deal with 
the consequences on labour intensity of home country production, finding that the latter 
can be lower when the employment in affiliates in developing economies is large (see, 
e.g., Mariotti, Mutinelli and Piscitello 2003 for the Italian case). 
Other studies focus, in turn, on the “jobs creation vs.  depletion” issue. For 
example, Brainard and Riker (1997) find only a partial substitution between 
employment in firm’s foreign affiliates and the parent at home (while substitution is 
larger between affiliates in different countries), suggesting that domestic employment 
performance of the multinationals need not worsen after INPOU. In other cases, it has 
been pointed out that employment in foreign affiliates in developing countries can be 
complementary to home employment, while a substitution relationship would emerge 
for employment in foreign affiliates in developed countries (see, among others, Konings 
and Murphy, 2001). Amiti and Wei (2004) find no evidence that INPOU led to job 
losses in the U.K. during the period 1995-2001, in either manufacturing to the services 
sectors; more in general, jobs depleted by service outsourcing are likely to be offset by 
new jobs created in the same sector. Finally, in a paper using Irish firm-level data, Gorg, 
Hanley and Strobl (2004) show that the effect of INPOU is positive particularly for 
large firms and for those based in broader international exports. 
The likely positive effects of INPOU on firm performance at home have been 




counterfactual for the firms venturing into INPOU, to which the performance after 
INPOU is compared. For instance, on the basis of a sample of Italian firms with more 
than 20 employees during the period 1993-98, Barba Navaretti and Castellani (2005, see 
also 2004a and 2004b), construct a counterfactual focusing on the firms that invest 
abroad for the first time and carry out a difference-in-difference estimate to assess the 
issue (see also Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2003, for a similar analysis on Austrian firms, 
and Barba Navaretti, Castellani and Disdier 2005 for the case of France). Thus, they 
show that the net effects of outward investments on the business in Italy are positive 
both in terms of size (turnover and employment) and in terms of efficiency. Moreover, 
the better performance of firms shifting from nationals to multinationals with respect to 
the “never shifting” ones does not deplete employment. Finally, there is no significant 
evidence that INPOU slows down the rate of employment growth. 
It is worth noting that all of these studies deal with the INPOU effect on the 
performance of investing firms per se. However, as stated above, especially in Italy this 
cannot be the end of the story, because the “networked” feature of manufacturing 
sectors implies that performance of non-INPOU firms may well be affected by others’ 
outward investment. This seems a novel insight in the literature. 
To our knowledge, the only contribution on this side is the almost 
contemporaneous work by Federico and Minerva (2006). Focusing on the employment 
performance of the local area from which the outward investments originate, the authors 
estimate an employment growth regression which relates changes in employment levels, 
by local area and industry, to the local industrial structure and FDI. The analysis is 
carried out for the period 1996-2001 and a level of disaggregation involving provinces 
and 12 manufacturing industries. In doing so, they find that: a)  local employment 
growth is positively associated with higher levels of FDI, (especially toward advanced 
economies); and b) the positive impact is concentrated in some capital-intensive 
industries, but no evidence of a negative relation is found for any other industry, also 
including traditional sectors. As opposed to our paper, however, Federico and Minerva 
do not analyze the change in the overall sector employment, but only the variation in 




3. DATA, EMPIRICAL ANALYSES, AND MAIN RESULTS 
This Section will firstly provide some details on our new database and display 
some descriptive evidence for preliminary discussion. Then, we will present the results 
of our econometric analyses. 
 
3.1 The data and some descriptive evidence 
3.1.1  Our database 
ISAE carries out monthly surveys on a panel of over 4,000 Italian manufacturing 
and extractive firms with no less than 10 employees. The ISAE sample is proportional 




reference universe, that is the set of ISTAT ASIA archive. The ISAE surveys are in 
keeping with the European harmonized scheme.
1 
In this context, in May 2003 and March 2005 ISAE carried out two ad hoc surveys 
on the manufacturing firms propensity to venture into International outsourcing of 
production (INPOU). The INPOU section of the 2005 questionnaire is reported in 
Appendix 1. Therefore, using the sub-sample of 3,193 manufacturing firms responding 
to both surveys, we are able to provide a timely study about the current features and 
changes of INPOU in Italy. Moreover, in order to focus more specifically on 
manufacturing industries and to make our model more robust, we decided to drop, from 
the original sample, the observations relating to non-manufacturing or to “poorly 




3.1.2  Some descriptive evidence 
Referring to 2005, International production outsourcing (INPOU) regards 3.7% of 
our sample, in terms of number of firms, and 6.0% in terms of the employee (in Italy) 
share of the sample. The noticeable difference between the two figures depends on the 
fact that INPOU is more widespread among lager-sized companies (Figure 1).
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Figure 1 Average and median employees at INPOU vs. no-INPOU companies 
 
Source: our calculations on the ISAE database. 
 
Companies representing an additional 2.8% (in terms of employees in Italy) 
declared they intended to venture into INPOU within 12 months (Table 1). By 
                                                 
1 In updating the panel, a specific attention is attached to continuity of the series (thus on “fidelity” of the 
firms). Accordingly, the “continuously-answering” firms are always present in the sample (this can 
occasionally lead to some oversized layers and a corresponding rise in sample numerosity) and only the 
under-represented layers are periodically integrated. 
2 It is worth mentioning that repeating the regression on the whole sample led to similar results. 
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geographical area, the phenomenon is most (least) intense in the North-East (in the 
South and Islands). 
 
Table 1 INPOU and prospective INPOU companies by geographic area 
(percentage, in terms of employees in Italy, on the total of each stratum) 
Geographic area  INPOU companies  Companies to become INPOU within 12 months
North-West  5.4 2.6 
North-East  8.7 3.3 
Centre  5.3 2.5 
South and Islands  1.4 2.3 
Total Italy  6.0  2.8 
Source: our calculations on the ISAE database. 
 
Table 2 INPOU destination areas 
(percentage, in terms of employees in Italy, on the total of each stratum)  
   Destination  (1) 
Company size  INPOU % (of 








Up to 99  3.5  47.6  13.1  4.3  3.2  27.8  20.5 
100-249 5.0  10.0  12.2  1.6  18.8  54.0  39.8 
250 & above  14.2  11.5  40.1  21.0  13.7  34.5  23.3 
Total 6.0  25.6  27.0  12.7  10.0  33.5  23.7 
Of which: (by sector) 
Food, drinks, tobacco  2.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  80.0  20.0 
Textiles & clothing  14.7  34.2 4.8  3.0  0.0 51.4  29.0 
Leather & shoes  15.1  74.3  20.9  10.3  0.0  21.8  10.0 
Wood products  2.2  29.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  70.1 
Paper & publishing  1.6  84.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  15.6 
Petroleum 1.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0 
Chemicals 0.5  21.5  0.0  0.0  24.7  0.0  78.5 
Rubber & plastic  5.6  6.5  53.0  0.0  40.6  6.5  66.4 
Non metallic products  0.5  29.9 29.3  0.0  0.0 22.0  48.1 
Metal products  3.4  10.3  37.7  0.0  6.6  24.2  22.3 
Mechanical products  7.3  6.1  32.2  32.4  32.1  20.9  29.5 
Electric machinery  13.8  19.8  61.9  30.7  7.5  36.8  0.0 
Means of transport  4.3  26.3  11.9  11.9  6.6  75.0  0.0 
Furnishing & other manufacturing  8.4  25.5  18.9  0.0  0.0  19.6  36.6 
(1) The sum of each row may go beyond 100 since any interviewed company could declare up to 3 INPOU 
destinations. – Source: our calculations on the ISAE database. 
 
As anticipated, inspecting destination areas suggests that INPOU is mostly 
triggered by cost-saving motives. Romania per se together with the group of Albania, 




destinations (Table 2). Specifically, Romania is the most preferred by smaller-sized 
INPOU companies and in traditional production sectors. 
Against the current situation in 2005, INPOU intentions seemed to decidedly 
privilege China, over Romania and other Central-Eastern European countries, as the 
favoured area of INPOU for the future (Costa, 2005). Furthermore, Costa and Ferri 
(2005) argue that INPOU may prove an effective way to increase firm size: the data 
show, in fact, that INPOU companies increase their group dimension significantly 
(Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Average and median employees at INPOU companies: Italy vs. total 
 
 
Naturally, the question one is most interested to answer is whether INPOU firms – 
while creating jobs abroad – sheds jobs in Italy. We can observe this from two different 
angles:  a) a “short-term angle” on the impact of INPOU, by looking at firms 
outsourcing between 2003 and 2005; b) a “medium-term angle”, by focusing on the 
companies which were already INPOU in 2003 (and confirmed to be INPOU in 2005). 
As to the short-term impact, we notice that employees in Italy of the companies 
which have become INPOU between 2003 and 2005 decrease by 5.3%  (Figure 3), 




















Figure 3 Average and median employees at new INPOU companies: 2003 vs. 2005 
 
 
Regarding the medium-term impact, we detect that employees in Italy of the 
companies which were already INPOU in 2003 (and were still so in 2005) decrease by 
6.2%, still less than the 8.5% drop in employment at the no-INPOU firms in the ISAE 
database. 
Thus, in line with the previous findings of Barba Navaretti and Castellani (2005) 
and Barba Navaretti et al. (2005), the descriptive evidence derived from the ISAE 
database seems to reject the hypothesis that INPOU has detrimental consequences for 
employment in Italy. Nevertheless, before drawing a conclusion on this, we will need to 
look at the econometric analysis. In addition, as mentioned, we will not stop at 
evaluating the employment performance of INPOU firms but will also investigate the 
eventuality that INPOU companies trigger negative externalities at sub-contracting 
firms. This indirect effect should not be overlooked in a productive structure like Italy’s 
one, consisting of myriads of networked enterprises. 
 
 
3.2 The econometric regressions 
On the basis of the new sample of 3,047 firm-level observations (after discarding 
those poorly represented sectors) we run a three-step quantitative study. Firstly, in 3.2.1, 
we analyze some determinants of the INPOU choice by individual firms, so linking our 




















Venables 2004, cap. 9, for a comprehensive review). Then we propose a twofold 
analysis of the effects of INPOU on employment in the Italian manufacturing industry. 
The first one, in 3.2.2, focuses on a direct effect, by including the “INPOU choice” in a 
linear regression that analyses the percentage change in employment for individual 
firms; the second one, in 3.2.3, deals with the indirect effects of INPOU. The latter is a 
relatively new comer in the literature on the issue, and a relatively neglected one among 
the studies on the Italian industry. However, as we pointed out above, in industry 
contexts like the Italian one, where firm size is quite small, and wide and strict 
productive relationships prevail (e.g. the numerous cases of subcontracting), INPOU is 
likely to have effects not only on firm employment, but also on sector employment. 
More importantly, these latter effects may have a different sign from the direct ones and 
partially offset them. 
 
 
3.2.1  The determinants of INPOU 
To verify the first model of the determinants of INPOU, we run a simple probit 
regression as a function of a set of firm-specific characteristics: 
 
(1) Prob(INPOU03i=1  ⎟ RELPRO03p, RELPRO032p, RELSECT03j, LOGEMP03i, 
S_EXP03i, S_EXP032i, SPECPRO03j,p, TRADi, SCALi, SPECi, NWi, NEi, CEi) 
 
where: RELPRO03p is an index of the “intensity of INPOU in the province p”, and 
expresses the share of firms that venture into INPOU on the whole of the firms in the 
province in 2003; the sign of its coefficient is expected to be positive; RELPRO032i is 
the square of RELPRO03i (we assume that the “province-impulse” effect increases more 
than proportionally as the INPOU in the province do); RELSECT03j is an index of the 
“intensity of INPOU in the sector j” (expressed by the classification ateco-2 digit) in 
2003, and the expected sign is positive; LOGEMP03i is the logarithm of the number of 
employees in the 2003 (the logarithmic form is expected to capture a nonlinear 
relationship), and the sign is likely to be positive; S_EXP03i is the share of export on 
firm turnover in 2003, imputed by the regressors to fill in the missing values, and its 
expected sign is positive (to the extent that a larger share reveals that the firm in 
question is somewhat more “open” to the international market and business); 
S_EXP032i is the square of S_EXP03i; SPECPRO03j.p is a control variable expressing 
the “intensity of specialization” of the province in terms of employees, that is the share 
of employees of the province p employed in industry j; TRADi, SCALi and SPECi are 
three dummy variables following the well-known classification by Pavitt (1984);
4 and 
                                                 
4 We remind that the Pavitt classification shares manufacturing industries out, on the basis of 
technological patterns, on 4 categories: a) traditional industries (e.g. foodstuffs, textiles, wood, clothing, 
leather) where products are similar within the sector, the plant scale is not significant, technology is 
incorporated in plants, and competition is based on prices; b) scale intensive industries (e.g. 
petrochemicals, cars, metallurgy, household appliances), where output is quite similar, the (large) plant 
size is crucial in reducing unit costs, the (process) technology is fundamental for having a competitive 




NWi, NEi, CEi are three dummies expressing the Italian macro-areas the firm operates in 
(North-West, North-East and Centre, respectively). 
The (robust) estimates of the probit model for the probability of investing abroad 
are reported in the first two (the “2003”) columns of Table 3 below. Single, double and 
triple asterisks indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
Table 3 Probit for the probability of INPOU in 2003 and 2005 
2003  2005 
Variable Coefficient  Variable   Coefficient 
relpro03 14.328047***  relpro05  18.125932*** 
relpro032 -33.914477*** relpro052  -56.887413*** 
relsect03 9.4251032***  relsect05  11.785961*** 
Logemp03 0.16087053*** logemp05 0.23061181*** 
s_exp03 3.1708948***  s_exp05  3.1727241*** 
s_exp032 -2.72826***  s_exp052  -2.9204902*** 
Specpro03 0.17382399  specpro05  -0.24596439 
Trad 0.46813536**  Trad  0.4464885* 
Scal 0.38987878*  Scal  0.38696708 
Spec 0.06029944  Spec  0.00184087 
Nw -0.2737446  Nw  -0.27719905 
ne -0.19991325  Ne -0.144182 
ce -0.13643082  Ce -0.19987646 
_cons -4.1968242*** _cons  -4.5346928*** 
N. obs.  3047 N. obs.  3040 
Wald chi2(13)  189.6500 Wald chi2(13)  167.3200 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 Prob > chi2  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  0.2280 Pseudo R2  0.2834 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
The signs of the coefficients are as expected. In other words, our model suggests 
that in 2003: a more “intense” INPOU in the province and industry of the firm (the 
linear effect prevails throughout the sample), a larger firm size, and a higher share of 
exports on turnover (our “openness” proxy) all tend to increase the probability that a 
manufacturing firm would choose to investing abroad. There is also some industry 
effect: operating in traditional and scale intensive industries (i.e. the typical “made in 
Italy” industries) increases the probability of INPOU. Finally, somewhat surprisingly, 
our data fail to capture any significant territorial effect (but these are partially embodied 
in the variable of intensity of INPOU in the provinces), neither is the intensity of 
specialization of the province significant. 
It is also worth noting that these results are confirmed (actually reinforced) by an 
analogous regression relating to 2005.
5 Thus, a larger size, belonging to a province 
                                                                                                                                               
photography), where products are differentiated, specific skills are relevant in production, technology is 
standardized and competition focus mainly on product characteristics; d) high tech industries (e.g. 
pharmaceuticals, office machines, medical and precision instruments), where output and prices are very 
differentiated and firms compete against each other mainly on innovation and technological knowledge. 




and/or to a sector heavily affected by the INPOU phenomenon, are at present relevant 
factors inducing Italian manufacturing firms to invest abroad. 
However, we are most interested in industry effects, chiefly in light of the recent 
discussions on the competitive threats posed by “newcomers” such as China or India to 
developed economies (like Italy) heavily based on traditional productions. Thus, we 
introduce China’s market share on the global economy, by sector (ateco-2 digit), as a 
proxy for the “perceived international competitive threats” for the firm, and assess it by 
running the following probit regression (where some of the other sector variables were 
dropped to avoid correlation problems): 
 
(2) Prob(DELOC03i=1  ⎟ RELPRO03p, RELPRO032p, LOGEMP03i, S_EXP03i, 
S_EXP032i, SPECPRO03jp, TRADi, SCALi, NWi, NEi, CEi, DCHINA9903j), 
 
where variables are defined as before and the new regressor DCHINA9903j indicates the 
absolute change in the Chinese international market share in industry J between 1999 
and 2003.
6 Once again, we conduct the analysis also for 2005 (Table 4). 
 
Table 4 Probit for the probability of INPOU, the “China effect” 
2003 2005 
Variable Coefficient  Variable Coefficient 
Relpro03 14.338372***  relpro05  19.107241*** 
Relpro032 -34.499836***  relpro052  -63.502491*** 
Logemp03 0.14695446***  logemp05 0.21065816***
s_exp03 3.294506***  s_exp05 3.3049505*** 
s_exp032 -2.7544874***  s_exp052 -2.8842992*** 
specpro03 0.22916507  specpro05 -0.15696522 
trad 0.14262278  trad 0.04933712 
scal 0.19591884  scal 0.05375234 
spec -0.08778856  spec -0.11331907 
nw -0.29859594*  nw -0.31936283 
ne -0.24096649  ne -0.19497096 
ce -0.11018326  ce -0.18037876 
dchina9903 6.0074894**  dchina0105 5.6883495*** 
_cons -3.5192734***  _cons -3.8376859*** 
N. obs.  3047  N. obs.  3040
Wald chi2(13)  192.91  Wald chi2(13)  177.54
Prob > chi2  0.0000  Prob > chi2  0.0000
Pseudo R2  0.2066  Pseudo R2  0.2548
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
While the “old” regressors are as in the previous estimates, our data suggests that 
the “Chinese threat” fosters firm level INPOU. In terms of the marginal effects (not 
                                                 
6 Of course, in the 2005 specification, DCHINA0105j indicates the analogous change between 2001 and 
2005. In both cases we opted for the absolute (as opposed to percentage) change, which should be the one 
to affect entrepreneur perceptions of China’s competition. In other words, an increase of 1% in such a 




reported in the table), in the 2003 analysis a unit increase in the difference between 
1999 and 2003 Chinese market shares raises the average probability of investing abroad, 




3.2.2  The direct employment impact of INPOU 
However, the angle from which the INPOU issue is to be really assessed, both for 
economic and policy issues, is the employment one: what about the INPOU effects on 
manufacturing employment? This is by now a hot subject in the industrial economics 
literature, in general and in Italy as well (see, among others, Brouwer, Mariotti and van 
Ommeren 2001, Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004, Barba Navaretti and Castellani 
2005, Federico and Minerva 2006). 
As stated before, consistently with the referred literature, our first step in this 
direction consists in estimating a simple linear model of change in firm employment: 
 
(3) DPEMPi = c + β1INPOU03i + β2RELPRO03ip + β3ITAEMPSEC01j  + 
β4SPECPRO03jp  + β5S_EXP03i + β6 S_EXP032i + β7TRADi + β8SCALi + β9HITECHi 
+ β10NWi + β11NEi + β12CEi + β13CHINAWORLD2003j + εi, 
 
where the other variables are defined as before, and DPEMPi is the percentage change 
in employment at firm i between 2003 and 2005. The results are reported in Table 5. 
 
















Number of obs  3047 
F( 13,  3033)  3.16 
Prob > F  0.0001 
R-squared 0.0147 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
                                                 
7 If, instead of considering the variations in China’s market share, we use the absolute levels, results do 





The lack of other relevant explicative variables negatively affects the fitness of our 
model. However, our focus is on the role of international production outsourcing in 
affecting employment performance of the firm. In this particular case, results are 
consistent with previous findings (e.g., Barba Navaretti and Castellani, 2005). Namely, 
INPOU03 is not significant, corroborating our descriptive evidence, and suggesting that 
the domestic employment performance of INPOU firms is no worse than at other firms. 
In spite of all the attention devoted to the employment consequences of INPOU, 
what the literature may have (so far) neglected is that the issue at stake has not one but 
two dimensions: the direct impact (just addressed) but also an indirect impact. In other 
words, as stated above, in a highly networked manufacturing industry such as the Italian 
one, the possibility is concrete that, from an occupational point of view, INPOU could 
heavily affect also the productive segment at large where the firm belongs. What’s 
more, in theory, INPOU could deliver a positive (or “not-so-negative”) direct impact at 
the firm per se, helping it limit job losses or enhance its market share, and a negative 
indirect impact on its productive segment, because of the termination of close trade 
relationships linking firms’ businesses, such as subcontracting and so on. 
 
 
3.2.3  The indirect employment impact of INPOU 
To capture the INPOU indirect effect on (industry) employment, we estimated a 
new model for the growth rate of employment in the sector, by considering a new 
dataset broken down by 21 sectors (ATECO-2 digit) and 19 region level data,
8 
consisting of 352 observations. Here too, we excluded the non-manufacturing and the 3 
“poorly represented” sectors (i.e. with only one observation in the cell), obtaining a new 
sample of 278 observations. This exercise could be replicated also by sector and 
province level data, using a consistent dataset of 1,035 observations (dropping to 584 
after replicating the exclusion as stated above). 
Therefore, we run the following two symmetric pairs of region-by-sector and 
province-by-sector regressions: 
 
(4) DPEMPSECj = c + β1AVGINPOU03jr + β2AVGINPOU032j,r + β3ITAVGEMP01j,r + 




(5) DPEMPSECj = c + β1AVGINPOU03jp + β2AVGINPOU032jp + β3ITAVGEMP01j,p 
+ β4SPECPRO03j,p  + β5S_AVGEXP03j,p + β6NWj + β7NEj + β8CEj + εj. 
 
where: DPEMPSECj is the percentage change (between 2003 and 2005) in the average 
number of employees in sector j; AVGINPOU03jr is the share of the number of firms in 
                                                 




sector  j and region r  (province  p) that relocated their production abroad in 2003;
9 
AVGINPOU032jr  is the square of AVGINPOU03jr;  ITAVGEMP01jr is the average 
number (at the national level) of employees in sector i and region r (province p) in 2001 
(this is a control variable to avoid endogeneity problems);
10  SPECREG03j,r is the 
“degree of specialization” of the region r in sector j (analogously for province p in 
SPECPRO03j.p); S_AVGEXP03jr is the average of the turnover share of exports in sector 
i and region r (province p) in 2003, imputed by the regressors to fill in the missing 
values);
11 NWj, NEj and CEj are the aforementioned territorial dummy variables. 
The results are all listed in Table 6 below. 
 
Table 6 The effect of INPOU on industry employment in 2003 
Region by sector data  Province by sector data 
Variable Original  dataset 
“Modified” 
dataset Variable  Original  dataset 
“Modified” 
dataset 
avginpou03 -0.143317***  -0.157828**  avginpou03 -0.086038***  -0.098173*** 
avginpou032 0.243606*** 0.342934*  avginpou032 0.082222*** 0.121547*** 
specreg03  0.035323 0.085262***  specpro03  0.010271 0.021694* 
s_avgexp03 -0.033358  0.015976  s_avgexp03 -0.011535  -0.000310 
Nw  -0.000704 0.002526  nw  -0.005577 -0.001378 
Ne -0.001779  0.000401  ne  -0.008494**  -0.005022 
Ce  -0.002190 -0.000071 ce  -0.006112 -0.008776* 
itavgemp01  0.000642*** 0.000542*** itavgemp01  0.000405*** 0.000163 
_cons -0.012606**  -0.026638***  _cons -0.012268***  -0.015019*** 
N  352 278 N  1035 584
F( 8, 343)  4.52  F(8, 1026)  4.88 
F(8, 269)    3.48 F(8, 575)    3.2
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0008 Prob > F  0.0000  0.0015
R-squared 0.1223  0.1240 R-squared 0.0497  0.0395
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
Among the significant variables, let us focus on those relating to INPOU. It 
appears that considering either regional or provincial area, employment dynamics tends 
to be poorer the more intense the INPOU phenomenon in the area and in the industry is. 
This seems to confirm that, INPOU may actually shed jobs in Italy when correctly 
accounting for its spill-over effects throughout the production chain. 
This result is partly qualified observing that the relation between INPOU and the 
change in industry employment features also a quadratic effect. This means that the 
ultimate effect is not the same throughout all the “degree of INPOU range”, but it 
depends on the net impact of the linear and quadratic terms. For example, as far as the 
region-by-sector specification is concerned, the trends of these components and the net 
one are all reported in the Figure 4 below. 
                                                 
9 Here each firm counts as one unit irrespective of its employees. In the near future we will check whether 
results are robust when we compute this share as an employment share. 
10 Controlling for specialization in terms of firms (as opposed to employees), does not change the results. 





The effect of 
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Therefore, for INPOU to have a positive effect on (sector) employment, we need 
to observe a substantive occurrence of the phenomenon in a given industry and a given 
region: indeed, the effect is constantly negative unless INPOU is undertaken by over 
50% of the firms operating in that industry and region, but this happens in less than 1% 




This paper aimed to investigate the micro determinants as well as the employment 
consequences of international production outsourcing (INPOU) by Italian 
manufacturing companies. To accomplish this task, we availed ourselves of a new firm-
level database developed at ISAE building on two ad-hoc surveys run in May 2003 and 
March 2005. Even though lacking some of the commonly used firm-level control 
variables, our database bestows two pluses: (i) thanks to the flexibility of the ISAE 
surveys, we have access to INPOU data more up to date than most other databases; (ii) 
owing to the fact that the ISAE sample is highly representative, we can observe INPOU 
in a more comprehensive manner than in some other studies. 
It seems that, albeit lagging with respect to other countries, Italian companies 
recently accelerated their INPOU. Our evidence on the determinants confirms that 
INPOU in Italy mostly counters emerging economies’ threats to traditional 
manufactured goods: INPOU disproportionately targets developing countries and 




Concerning the employment consequences of INPOU, beside corroborating the 
previous literature on the direct occupational impact at INPOU firms per se, we extend 
the analysis to the possible indirect employment effects. As to the former, we concur 
with previous papers that INPOU firms’ domestic employment performances are no 
worse than at matching no-INPOU firms. However, this evidence might be partial and 
potentially misleading. Given Italy’s industrial structure (small-sized networked 
enterprises), in fact, INPOU might favor employment performance at the very firms 
undertaking it while imparting negative spill-over effects on suppliers. This worry 
would be less justified in other countries, where INPOU is dominated by large-sized 
companies. In such a case, the occupational impact of INPOU might be generally 
limited within the individual company – possibly inducing labor mobility across 
different mother company’s departments and/or group affiliates. However, this is 
unlikely the end of the story in Italy, where most of the brunt may fall on subcontracting 
firms. Then, INPOU could induce in Italy negative indirect employment effects. Our 
evidence that employment performances worsen in the productive segments with 
strongest INPOU supports this conjecture. 
Experts in the field might wish to make a further effort to study the indirect 
employment effects of INPOU we just uncovered. More analyses – perhaps using more 
appropriate and detailed information – may be needed to confirm its existence and to 
establish its economic significance. 
In this background, however, the latter results of ours may start feeding the policy 
debate in Italy. Clearly, the issue is not whether to limit INPOU, which is one of the key 
options to preserve competitiveness (Rossi, 2006), but how to deal with its negative 
effects on Italy’s job market. Considering that the spill-over effects of INPOU provide a 
negative externality on the firms in business relation with the company venturing into 
INPOU, there seems to be scope for some type of public sector intervention through 
measures able to amortize these effects. For instance, in view of the fact that INPOU 
generally induces a shift from unskilled to skilled labor demand, public programs could 
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“SECTION ON INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION OUTSOURCING” 
 
Q1. Did your company outsource any production abroad? 
  Yes   1 Go to Q2   
  No   2 Go to Q3 
  No answer__________3 Go to Q3 
 
Q2. Can you please tell us to which foreign countries your company outsourced production?  
       (maximum 3 countries) 
  C h i n a             1 
  I n d i a               2  
  R o m a n i a               3 
  T u r k e y               4 
  Albania or Ex-Yugoslavia (Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia)    5 
  Ex-USSR (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine)     6 
  Other Center-Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovak Republic)                     7 
  Japan and other Asian countries (Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Pakistan, Thailand, Taiwan)    8 
  N o r t h   A m e r i c a                 9 
  Central  e  Southern  America           10  
  ( 1 5 - m e m b e r )   E u r o p e a n   U n i o n            11 
  Other (Africa, Oceania)            12 
  N o   a n s w e r              13 
 
 
Q3. Does your company intend to outsource production abroad over the next 12 months? 
  Yes   1 Go to Q4 
  No   2 Stop if answer to Q1 was 2 or 3, otherwise go to Q5 
  No answer__________3 Stop if answer to Q1 was 2 or 3, otherwise go to Q5 
 
Q4. Can you please tell us to which foreign countries your company intends to outsource 
production over the next 12 months?  
       (maximum 3 countries) 
  C h i n a             1 
  I n d i a               2  
  R o m a n i a               3 
  T u r k e y               4 
  Albania or Ex-Yugoslavia (Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia)    5 
  Ex-USSR (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine)     6 
  Other Center-Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovak Republic)                     7 
  Japan and other Asian countries (Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Pakistan, Thailand, Taiwan)    8 
  N o r t h   A m e r i c a                 9 
  Central  e  Southern  America           10  
  ( 1 5 - m e m b e r )   E u r o p e a n   U n i o n            11 
  Other (Africa, Oceania)            12 





Q5. Can you please tell us how many employees are working at your foreign affiliates? 
  1-20 employees        1 
  21-50 employees        2    
  51-250 employees        3    
  Beyond 250 employees    4  
  No answer        5 
 
Q6. Production outsourcing by your company was CHIEFLY financed thorough: 
 (1 answer only) 
  Own capital      1    
  Bank credit      2    
  Other forms of financing  3 
  No answer      4 
 
Q7. The intended Production outsourcing by your company was CHIEFLY financed thorough: 
(1 answer only) 
  Own capital      1    
  Bank credit      2    
  Other forms of financing  3 
  No answer      4 
 
End of the interview 